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Abstract
The endogenous formation of coalitions involving asymmetric …rms and
their stability are analyzed as a function of di¤erences in e¢ciency and of
the …xed cost of production. Results are derived for cartels as well as for
mergers. Players have constant but di¤erent marginal costs of production
and no rule of pro…t sharing is …xed. The analysis is illustrated for a speci…c
path of collusion. Finally welfare e¤ects are studied and some conclusions
are drawn for antitrust policy.
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1. Introduction
The subject of coalition formation has received in recent years a growing attention
in economic literature, accompanying the increasing importance of merging as
a competitive strategy in oligopolistic industries. After a period in which the
evolution of the industry has been analyzed mostly in terms of entry and exit,
following major developments in noncooperative game theory, attention seems
now to be turning to mergers and acquisitions as another source of industry
evolution, giving rise to a new interest in cooperative game theory.1 Still, as
this new literature places great emphasis on the “noncooperative foundations for
cooperative behavior”, links between both …elds of Game Theory are now better
understood than before.
A signi…cant part of merger operations occurs for …nancial reasons (speculative
motives); however, strategic motives such as increasing e¢ciency or enhancing
monopoly power are also at the origin of many mergers.
Collusive behavior may take several forms: …rst it may be explicit or implicit.
The implicit form is generally known as tacit collusion and requires a dynamic
context to be implementable. The explicit form of collusive behavior - mergers,
cartels and joint ventures - can be more or less complete. Mergers are the most
complete type of collusive agreement: the separate entities of the constituent
…rms disappear and start acting as a single unit thereafter. At the other extreme
lie joint ventures, which are designed for …rms to bene…t from scale economies
while remaining separate entities.
In this paper we deal with horizontal mergers (i.e., mergers among …rms in
the same product market)2 and cartels, and analyze the role played by e¢ciency
di¤erences in their motivation and stability. This issue is still far from being
completely and satisfactorily explored in the literature, due to the di¢culty in
handling asymmetry. In fact, symmetry between players is usually assumed and
when heterogeneity is allowed, a …xed rule of payo¤ division is postulated (e.g.
Farrell and Scotchmer(1988) and Bloch(1996)). We do not …x any rule of pro…t
sharing, rather leaving it for the bargaining process between joining …rms, which
is assumed to be costless.
We consider that an agreement is reached whenever it is pro…table for the …rms
1The problem of the choice between internal growth (entry by building) and external growth
(entry by buying) has been addressed for example by Gilbert and Newbery(1992).
2Mergers are often categorized as horizontal, vertical, or conglomerate. Horizontal mergers
take place between …rms in the same line of business; in a vertical merger the buyer expands
backward or forward; conglomerate mergers involve companies in unrelated lines of business. See
for instance Scherer and Ross(1990) and Brealey and Myers(1988) for some historical perspective
on these various types of mergers and for some examples.
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involved. By imposing the condition that joint pro…ts should be greater than or
equal to the sum of the ex ante pro…ts of the …rms involved, we guarantee that no
…rm loses when it decides to join with another; we assure that, in the absence of
bargaining costs, there can be some division of pro…ts between them which makes
it worthwhile for both to join, without …xing an a priori rule of sharing.3 We are
therefore allowing for side payments, otherwise the heterogeneity of …rms would
make it more di¢cult to …nd admissible agreements (i.e., individually rational
agreements) and to sustain them.4
In turn, for some arrangement to be stable this kind of incentive to merge
further (broaden the coalition) must not exist (external stability). These two
conditions - pro…tability and external stability - together with a division of the
coalitional pro…t are su¢cient to determine equilibrium mergers. For equilibrium
cartels a condition for internal stability (that no …rm bene…ts from leaving the
agreement) must also be set. Our stability analysis proceeds stepwise, from a
given partition to an “adjacent” partition (that is, with one player less or one
player more); hence the aggregation movements we consider involve just two
…rms or groups of …rms and the disaggregation movements give rise to just one
additional player.
The treatments which are closest to ours, in the sense of also dealing with
heterogeneity of the agents, are Farrell and Shapiro(1990a), who consider quite
general cost functions but do not model the merging process, Faulí-Oller(1995),
who restricts asymmetry to the existence of two di¤erent types of players, the
e¢cient and the ine¢cient, and Ray and Vohra(1996), who study the endogenous
formation of coalitions in the symmetric case as well as in the general case of
asymmetry. We model asymmetry by introducing a parameter ® which stands
for the (constant) marginal cost di¤erence between …rms. The analysis on the
incentives to form coalitions and their stability is then performed as a function
of ® and of a parameter f representing the …xed cost of operating a …rm.
Following the positive analysis we study the consequences of the …rms’ agree-
ments on social welfare and derive some conclusions about the social desirability
of di¤erent concentration movements. It is shown that for small e¢ciency di¤er-
ences no merger is good in terms of total welfare in the absence of signi…cant cost
savings, whereas for large ® the optimal merger is welfare-enhancing even if there
are no savings in …xed cost (f = 0), and, as expected, involves the absorption
of a very ine¢cient …rm. The relationship between changes in market concentra-
3Many ways of modeling the process of the formation of coalitions have been proposed in the
literature. Ours is the simplest: the coalition emerges whenever it is pro…table.
4The side payments which we allow for are within coalitions. Transfers between coalitions
are not allowed (so a …rst best cannot be achieved).
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tion and changes in economic welfare is also analyzed and conclusions are drawn
for approval rules. An antitrust policy based on concentration measures may be
misleading, but the best movement in terms of social welfare and the one which
produces the smallest increase in concentration are the same in most of the cases.
The analysis of this paper can be extrapolated to other social situations in
which individuals di¤ering by an observable characteristic (and having a …xed
cost of performing some activity) may want to form coalitions. Indeed, the
subject of coalition formation has already been applied to di¤erent situations
such as trading structures in bilateral oligopolies (Bloch and Ghosal(1997)), the
formation of associations including R&D joint ventures or the adoption of a
common standard (Bloch(1995)), the formation of syndicates (Guesnerie(1977)
and Greenberg(1979)), the possibility of mergers between domestic and foreign
…rms (Horn and Persson(1997b)), trade agreements (Macho et al(1994)), customs
unions (Yi(1996)), international agreements for the protection of the environment
(Carraro and Siniscalco(1993)) and voting games (Peleg(1984)), among others.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the game-theoretic
solution concepts usually employed for analyzing the formation and stability of
coalitions and also provides a revision of the main topics usually addressed in the
Industrial Organization literature on mergers and cartels. Section 3 presents the
analytical framework and an illustration for the case of three …rms. Section 4
generalizes for the case of n …rms and establishes the main results of the paper.
Section 5 contains the welfare analysis and section 6 concludes. Formal proofs
and details are given in the Appendix.
2. The GT tools and the IO literature
In this section we brie‡y present the game-theoretic tools usually employed to
study the subject of coalition formation and go through the main literature on
mergers and cartels, from an Industrial Organization perspective.
2.1. The GT tools
The analysis of coalition formation within the framework of cooperative Game
Theory makes use of cooperative solution concepts such as the core (for example,
Aumann(1967) and an application to trade agreements in Macho et al(1994)),
the von Neumann and Morgenstern stable sets (Espinosa and Iñarra(1995)) or
the Shapley value (Hart and Kurz(1983) use a variant of the Shapley value, the
“coalition structure value”).
This cooperative framework, however, ignores externalities among coalitions
and is not suitable to describe the formation of coalitions as a noncooperative
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process. It seems reasonable to believe that there are spillovers (externalities,
either positive or negative) to the other players when some decide to join. Hence,
in recent years many authors have resorted to noncooperative solution concepts
to determine the equilibrium number, size and composition of coalitions,5 es-
pecially considering games in extensive form. Examples of this approach are
Bloch(1996), Kamien and Zang(1990, 1991 and 1993), Nilssen and Sorgard(1998),
Yi and Shin(1995) and Faulí-Oller(1995).
Extensive-form games capture situations in which players announce sequen-
tially their desire to take part in a coalition (sequential games of coalition for-
mation) and are especially appropriate to capture forward-looking behavior by
agents. These models with “farsighted” players, in which decisions are based on
the …nal outcome, that is, considering all the chain reactions to the present move
until the end, are one of the …elds that currently deserve more interest (see for
instance Ray and Vohra(1996) and Espinosa(1996), this latter as an application
of the largest consistent set notion of Chwe(1994)).6
Within the framework of strategic-form games, the most important solution
concepts are extensions of the Nash equilibrium; these are appropriate to games
in which all players simultaneously announce their decision to cooperate (simul-
taneous games of coalition formation).
In many situations in real life it is not possible to sign binding agreements
and therefore agreements must rely on their self-enforceability. The Nash solution
is a necessary condition for self-enforceability, but is not su¢cient: in fact, it is
usually possible for players to make some arrangements (form coalitions) which
are mutually bene…cial, provided that all the others do not change their strate-
gies (take the actions of the complement as …xed). The simple Nash solution
excludes this situation, but the concepts of strong Nash equilibrium (SNE) and
coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE) contemplate it. These re…nements to
the Nash solution limit the set of equilibria (usually very large) and thus allow
more accurate prediction. Since they are of a cooperative nature we can say
that simultaneous games are actually on the border line between cooperative and
noncooperative game theory.7
5This distinction between cooperative and noncooperative approaches corresponds to the
distinction between the two types of representation of games, in coalitional (or characteristic)
function form and in partition function form.
6The forward-looking behavior induces a higher degree of cooperation because …rms tend to
resist incentives to cheat, anticipating the consequences.
7Yi and Shin(1995) separate simultaneous games of coalition formation into two categories:
open membership games, where players are free to join or leave any coalition, and exclusive
membership games, where the members of the coalition are allowed to deny membership to
outsider …rms.
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According to the notion of SNE (Aumann(1959)) an equilibrium agreement
must be immune to deviations by every conceivable coalition, while according to
the notion of CPNE (Bernheim et al(1987) and Bernheim and Whinston(1987))
an equilibrium agreement must be immune to deviations by every conceivable
coalition which are also immune to further deviations by members of the deviat-
ing group (consistency requirement; notice that it embeds some forward-looking
behavior, though players see only one step ahead).8 That is, some deviations
which would invalidate a SNE do not invalidate a CPNE, because they are not
valid deviations and therefore a CPNE has more chance to “survive” deviating
movements.9 In this sense the SNE is a stronger concept and more di¢cult to
…nd.
More recently there have appeared cooperative tools that take externalities
into account. The equilibrium binding agreements of Ray and Vohra(1997) are
the “parallel” of CPNE, since they rule out coalitional deviations that are not
themselves immune to further deviations by subcoalitions.
2.2. The IO literature
According to the assumptions made and to the solution concept employed, results
in the literature have ranged from the impossibility of merging up to monopoly
(v.g., Kamien and Zang(1990 and 1991), provided that the industry has su¢-
ciently numerous …rms) to models which predict the possible complete monop-
olization of the industry in the absence of regulatory devices, as for example in
Salant et al(1983) (henceforth sometimes referred to simply as SSR).
In SSR’s paper it is shown that in a Cournot setting exogenous mergers may be
unpro…table for the …rms involved, therefore creating few incentives to join: the
reason is that the new …rm tends to reduce quantity (because competition is made
less aggressive by the merger), causing an increase in the quantity produced by
8The fact that only deviations by members of the deviating group are considered in the
concept of CPNE is still a limitation. The study of abstract stable sets in which the dominance
relation allows for the possibility of a subset T of a deviating coalition S attracting a coalition
Q ½ N jS (where N is the universe of players) in order to jointly further deviate has given rise to
some equilibrium concepts, depending on the information structure. If previous agreements are
common knowledge and under the assumption that all other players will stick to the announced
tuple of strategies, the appropriate solution is the one resulting from “coalitional contingent
threats” (Greenberg(1990), pgs.102-6): if some coalition declares that its members will adopt a
di¤erent strategy pro…le any other coalition may respond in the same way to the revised proposal
and the process continues until an equilibrium is found.
9The concept of CPNE can also be applied to extensive form games, giving rise to perfect
coalition-proof Nash equilibria (e.g., Matutes and Padilla(1994) for an application of perfect
CPNE in pure strategies to the formation of shared ATM networks).
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outsiders. In the absence of …xed costs and under the assumptions of symmetry
and homogeneity of the product this is the sole e¤ect; the joint pro…t is thus
smaller than the sum of the pre-merger pro…ts of the …rms involved and so there is
no incentive to merge. Mergers must then be motivated by monopoly power alone
and the authors show that with linear demand it is necessary that at least 80%
of the …rms in the industry merge to pro…tably exploit market power (minimal
pro…table coalition size). Some regulatory device that prevents more than 45
of the industry from colluding therefore makes full monopolization impossible.
Cheung(1992) reduces this minimal market share to 50% by allowing for any
demand satisfying second-order conditions.
The result on the private unpro…tability of mergers can be reversed for exam-
ple if the savings in …xed cost implied by the operation are su¢ciently important.
When …rms are not equally e¢cient, as in our paper, there is an additional e¤ect
that may cause this merger to be pro…table even in the absence of …xed costs,
the switch of production from the ine¢cient …rm to the e¢cient one. A similar
idea is present in the criticism of Perry and Porter(1985) to SSR: the new cost
function must be di¤erent from the initial one, since as a result of merging, the
…rm now has access to a technology which may be strictly more e¢cient than the
one before; the price increase can be su¢cient to compensate for the decline in
production, therefore making the merger pro…table.
With Bertrand competition mergers are always bene…cial (because the reac-
tion of outsiders reinforces the price increase due to merger) and the more …rms
involved, the more pro…table they are (Deneckere and Davidson(1985)). Other
attempts to reverse the results by SSR on the private unpro…tability of merging
include relaxing the assumption of homogeneity of the product. The existence
of product di¤erentiation reinforces the results obtained under price competition
and allows mergers to be privately pro…table even under quantity competition as
long as the degree of di¤erentiation is su¢ciently high (Granero(1997)).
The abandonment of the assumption that the newly created …rm remains a
Cournot player, by allowing it to behave as a Stackelberg leader if its size is
large enough,10 also reverts SSR’s results (again Granero(1997) and also Daugh-
ety(1990)). Faulí-Oller(1996), in turn, has considered a more general demand
function than that employed by SSR and has studied the e¤ects of its degree of
concavity on the pro…tability of the agreement; Gaudet and Salant(1991) have
also reached the possibility of pro…table mergers under general demand and cost
functions (though equal for all …rms). In the current paper the symmetry as-
10See Sadanant and Sadanant(1996) for the grounds of approximating “the behavior of a
dominant …rm with a …nite fringe (...) by Stackelberg equilibrium”. Sha¤er(1995) also considers
Cournot behavior within the fringe and leader behavior by the cartel.
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sumption is relaxed and a reversion of SSR’s results is also obtained: mergers can
be privately pro…table even with no …xed cost savings and under all the other
assumptions of SSR, provided …rms are su¢ciently asymmetric.
The incentive to free-ride (let the others merge and stay out of those groups),
also known as the “hold-up” problem, subsists in all these variations, as outsiders
earn more than …rms participating in the merger.11 The recognition of the free-
riding problem was …rst made by Stigler(1950), who stated that the promoter of a
merger could receive every encouragement from the other …rms but participation.
Szidarovszki and Yakowitz(1982) show that if some …rms form a cooperative group
their joint pro…t can fall below that of the non-cooperative situation, whereas the
pro…t of the non-cooperating …rms does not decrease. The same kind of idea is
present in the price-leadership model of d’Aspremont et al(1983), in which fringe
…rms enjoy higher pro…ts than members of the dominant cartel.12 These are clear
examples of positive spillovers in games of coalition formation (coalition members
provide some type of public good, which external …rms enjoy without supporting
its cost). The incentive to free-ride is at the origin of the potential instability of
coalitions.
Since the work of Hart and Kurz(1983), and bearing in mind the unpro…tabil-
ity characteristic of some exogenous mergers, as detected by Salant et al(1983),
several papers have tried to model the process of coalition formation in an en-
dogenous way, trying to predict which mergers will occur in a given situation.
With a purpose similar to ours but assuming homogeneity of …rms, Rajan(1989)
derives the endogenous formation of coalitions as a function of some relevant mar-
ket characteristics. Kamien and Zang(1990 and 1991) use an allocation scheme
based on the bids each …rm makes for all the others and on the asking price each
…rm announces for itself to determine which acquisitions will take place. Ray
and Vohra(1996) suggest a bargaining process in which players are farsighted and
therefore care about the end results of their moves to select which proposals will
be made and accepted. This is actually the line of research that is currently
receiving more attention.
The desirability of mergers in terms of welfare is ambiguous, due to the
trade-o¤ between e¢ciency gains and reduced competition (there are gains ac-
11 In our variation (asymmetry) it is not clear whether this incentive subsists or not, because
the payo¤ for each member of the agreement is unknown (remember that we do not …x any rule
of division) and thus cannot be compared with the payo¤ of the outside …rms.
12This model is the simplest example of an open membership game. It makes use of the notions
of internal and external stability, which we also employ in the present paper. The incentive to
free-ride is not present in d’Aspremont et al(1983)’s model if the fall in price due to increased
competition as one …rm defects gives rise to a fall in pro…t that o¤sets the advantage of joining
the competitive fringe (Donsimoni et al(1986)).
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cruing to increased productive e¢ciency, and losses due to allocative ine¢ciency
- Williamson(1968)). Horizontal mergers have undesirable e¤ects on price-cost
margins, both through the concentration index and through the conjectural vari-
ation (refer to the Lerner index of Cowling and Waterson(1976)). However they
also have bene…cial e¤ects on cost, as the e¢cient …rms increase their market
shares at the expense of the ine¢cient ones (unless the X-ine¢ciency of Leiben-
stein(1966) dominates). So, total industry pro…t and per …rm pro…t tend to
increase.
In the seminal work of Szidarovszki and Yakowitz(1982) it is shown that,
under certain assumptions for the unit price function and for the (di¤erent) cost
functions of the …rms, cooperative grouping implies a decrease in production
levels. This is true in most models of merging and is at the origin of the negative
e¤ect implied on consumers’ welfare. Concerning total welfare SSR prove that
unpro…table exogenous mergers may still be socially desirable, due to e¢ciency
gains resulting from savings in …xed cost. On the other hand when mergers
are modeled endogenously (Kamien and Zang(1990), v.g.) socially bene…cial
mergers that are unpro…table for the …rms involved will not take place and the
socially undesirable mergers that are privately bad will also fail to occur in the
equilibrium, and therefore need not be of concern.
It is generally believed that horizontal mergers, by reducing the number of
…rms, facilitate tacit collusion (see for example Osborne(1976), who considers
the bene…ts of a smaller number of …rms for the internal stability of a cartel in
terms of making it easier to share the pro…ts and to detect and deter cheating):
in this sense they would hurt welfare. This is the impact on the Lerner index
via the conjectured response of the rivals. Davidson and Deneckere(1984), how-
ever, pointed out the fact that mergers increase the pro…ts earned at the threat
point (the equilibrium to which the game reverts if cheating is detected), thereby
hindering tacit collusion and potentially raising welfare.
As regards the relationship between concentration and welfare, Farrell and
Shapiro(1990a) show that an increase in the Her…ndahl index may not necessar-
ily be welfare reducing and provide su¢cient conditions for pro…table mergers
to raise welfare (analyzing the external e¤ects of the merger on the rival …rms
and on consumers); these conditions, however, may no longer be su¢cient when
mergers are interdependent, in the sense that the realization of some merger to-
day may in‡uence the occurrence of mergers tomorrow, as shown by Nilssen and
Sorgard(1998). A positive relationship between welfare e¤ects and level of concen-
tration of the non-participating …rms was found by McAfee and Williams(1992),
who also proved that mergers which increase the dimension of the largest …rm or
create a new largest …rm reduce welfare.
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A common feature of most coalition formation models developed up to now
is the lack of heterogeneity of …rms. When di¤erences among …rms are allowed
when modeling the merging process, a …xed rule of payo¤ division is assumed
(Farrell and Scotchmer(1988) and Bloch(1996)), which highly conditions the re-
sults obtained. In this paper we tr s o is o s )r peoI hssuh
allocation of outputs across facilities). Every …rm observes the merging activity
among the others and knows exactly how e¢cient its rivals are.
For the sake of simplicity we consider that there is no entry in nor exit from
this industry, so the number of players is …xed apart from changes due to joining
or separating movements. In an industry with n …rms there are 2n ¡ 1 possible
coalitions. The number of partitions is obviously smaller and the number of k-
…rm oligopolies even smaller (1 · k · n), though all of them are of course very
large. The formulas for the total number of partitions and for the total number of
oligopolies with k …rms can be found in the Appendix. Notice that in a symmetric
industry all k-…rm partitions yield the same level of concentration, in other words,
it is indi¤erent which …rms join; however if …rms are not equally e¢cient there
are di¤erent levels of concentration associated with the various k-…rm oligopolies.
3.1.2. Payo¤s
The payo¤s are the pro…ts each …rm receives in every given market structure,
after competing in quantities. The good is homogeneous, demand is linear and
there is no uncertainty about demand conditions. Firms that merge or form a
cartel remain Cournot players after the operation. For …rms belonging to a group,
payo¤s are not clearly de…ned, but depend on the way the members agree to share
the common pro…t, which we do not …x.
3.1.3. Strategies and equilibrium
Given that the rest of the market is unchanged, coalitions C1 6= ; and C2 6= ;
will join and form C = C1 [ C2 if and only if
¼C ¡ f ¸ ¼C1 ¡ f + ¼C2 ¡ f
where, abusing notation, ¼C denotes the variable pro…t of coalition C given the
existing partition of the rest of the market (pro…tability condition).14
The new coalition C 6= ; is externally stable if and only if there exists no
pro…table way of broadening it (given that the rest of the market is unchanged):
for all C 0 ½ C; C0 6= ;
¼C[C0 ¡ f · ¼C ¡ f + ¼C0 ¡ f
gain to the low-cost …rm from the merger is the elimination of the high-cost …rm as a Cournot
rival”.
14All notation employed shall be understood in this context: given the existing partition of
the rest of the players.
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where C denotes the complement of C in the universe of players.
It is internally stable if and only if there exists no subcoalition of it which
receives a higher payo¤ by acting alone than by staying in (given that the rest of
the market is unchanged): for all C00 ½ C; C00 6= ;
¼C00 jCnC00 ¡ f ·
X
i2C00
(¼(i)jC ¡ f)
CnC00 denotes the complement of C 00 in C and the use of ¼C00 jCnC00 is an abuse of
notation that reinforces that coalition C 00 is competing against CnC00. Indeed, it
is already clear that every coalitional pro…t is de…ned given the partition of the
rest of the market: we are stressing that coalition C 00 was taken out of coalition
C. This abuse of notation is employed in some other expressions throughout
the paper. In the right hand side of the inequality the pro…t of every i 2 C 00 is
denoted by ¼(i)jC , meaning that coalition C is still “complete”, and where the use
of parenthesis is intended to capture the notion that …rm i’s pro…t is unknown
as long as the …rm belongs to a coalition, since we do not …x any rule of payo¤
division.
It is assumed that joining and separating are costless movements.15 For the
purpose of our analysis we will consider broadening movements to include just
one player more and also separating movements of just one player (C0 and C00 are
singletons). This corresponds to most of the joining and separating movements
actually observed.
Trivially the grand coalition is externally stable, whereas the totally dispersed
market structure is internally stable.
We consider two di¤erent types of agreements: cartels, in which a number of
independent …rms join to make price or output decisions (in our case, output)
and that su¤ers from each participant having an incentive to break away and join
the competitive fringe, and mergers, the ultimate form of collusion in which …rms
lose their separate entities. We assume that the main di¤erence between cartels
and mergers is that in the …rst case …rms are free to exit the agreement, whereas
in the second case they are committed to cooperation (mergers are irreversible,
once an agreement is reached it cannot be broken).16 For the stability analysis
15 In particular, we consider that the buyer does not pay any premium for the selling …rm over
its value as a separate entity (represented either by its market value, or by its market value plus
the valuation expected by investors following the acquisition).
16Both problems become equivalent if we allow for divestitures or for the divisions of the …rm
that came out of the merger to spin o¤ into several …rms and become independent entities at any
time (for examples of spino¤s and explanations of motives see, for instance, Habib et al (1997)),
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of pro…table cartels we thus have to check both internal and external stability,
but for the stability analysis of pro…table mergers we have to check only external
stability.
Our stability analysis is stepwise: we restrict attention to one concentration
movement at a time (two …rms or groups of …rms joining) and we also analyze
only one movement of exit from a group at a time. This means, for example, that
the simultaneous exit of two …rms, each on its own, must be analyzed …rst as the
exit of one and then, in the resulting market structure, as the exit of the other one,
otherwise we would be analyzing deviations by more than one coalition of players
at the same time. As a consequence, we can only proceed from an oligopoly with
k operating …rms to an “adjacent” oligopoly, with k ¡ 1 or k + 1 operating …rms
(corresponding to external instability and internal instability of the coalition(s)
that constitute the k-…rm oligopoly, respectively).
The move from an oligopoly with k operating …rms to another oligopoly with
k operating …rms cannot be studied within our framework. As stated before (see
section 2.1), a solution concept based on “coalitional contingent threats” would
be required.
An equilibrium is de…ned by a stable partition, according to the de…nitions
given above, and by the corresponding payo¤ division within its coalition(s).
By setting f = 0 the results obtained can be identi…ed with an industry with
no …xed cost of production, in which case the main parameter driving coalitions
(apart from the search for market power) is ®; on the other hand, if ® is set to
zero, then the savings in …xed cost stand as the main determinant of the joining
process (idem), as in the work of Espinosa and Iñarra(1995). When ® is strictly
greater than zero our analysis is an extension of the previous literature on the
pro…tability and stability of coalitions to the case in which …rms are not equally
e¢cient.
3.2. The case of n = 3
Consider an industry with 3 …rms. Firm 1 (the most e¢cient) has a constant
marginal cost of production of c¡ ®, …rm 2 of c and …rm 3 (the least e¢cient) of
c + ®. There is a …xed cost equal to f . Demand is linear: P = a ¡ Q where Q is
total production of the homogeneous good by the industry, a > c > ®.
With n = 3 there are three possible oligopolistic structures: monopoly (the
grand coalition, represented either by M or by {1,2,3}), duopoly and triopoly
or, alternatively, if the cartel has perfect enforcement. The occurence of divestitures is often
motivated by the threat of further mergers: selling the main object of the takeover bid may
induce the proposed acquirer to drop its bid.
13
(represented either by T or by {1}{2}{3}). There are three possible duopoly
constellations: …rms 1 and 2 together against …rm 3 ({1,2}{3}), …rms 1 and 3
together against …rm 2 ({1,3}{2}) or …rms 2 and 3 together competing against
…rm 1 ({1}{2,3}).
All the stability analysis is extensively described in the Appendix. We re-
port here only the …nal results (we consider both the cartel situation and the
irreversible merger situation)
Proposition 3.1. In a market with three …rms
a) the completely disperse structure prevails for f small enough. The value of f
allowed for the stability of triopoly increases with ³, the di¤erence between the
exogenous demand and the marginal cost of the median …rm, and decreases with
the e¢ciency gap ®:
b) the most internally stable duopoly is {1,3}{2} and the least internally stable
is {1,2}{3}. Duopoly is never externally stable, so it is never stable.
c1) if we allow …rms to leave the coalition when they …nd it pro…table (cartels),
then the grand c  Tc (a) Tj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4. The general case of n …rms
In this section we present the main results that can be obtained concerning the
pro…tability and stability of coalitions under a general framework; these results
are then particularized for a speci…c collusion path.
The model is as described in subsection 3.1. The game is two-stage: …rms form
(or not) coalitions and then the resulting groups compete in quantities. For all n
…rms to be in the market we have to set some prior conditions on the values of ®
and f , in order to assure positive quantities: these conditions derive directly from
imposing qnn > 0 (where the subscript refers to the n-th …rm and the superscript
signals an n-…rm oligopoly) and ¼nn ¡ f > 0 respectively (¼ denotes the variable
pro…t). The …rst condition gives rise to the restriction on ®: ® <® (³; n) and the
second condition gives rise to the restriction on f : f <f (³; ®; n) = ¼nn. (See the
Appendix for the formal derivations).
4.1. Main results
Having a completely dispersed market, in which all n …rms operate separately,
we will analyze its stability in terms of the parameters ® and f and study the
relative pro…tability of the various two-…rm coalitions that transform the market
in an (n¡1)-…rm oligopoly. We analyze then the stability of these agreements (by
adding to the condition for internal stability the condition for external stability)
and try to generalize to broader coalitions, and thus more concentrated market
structures.
4.1.1. Two-…rm agreements
The n-…rm oligopoly is unstable whenever it is pro…table for any …rms i and j to
merge,19 that is, whenever
¼n¡1ij ¡ f ¸ ¼ni ¡ f + ¼nj ¡ f
This condition says that in the assumed absence of bargaining costs there is
at least one way of sharing the joint pro…t of i and j such that each …rm is better
o¤ by joining than by staying alone (the merger represents a Pareto improvement
for i and j). It is thus clear that the condition for external instability of the
eht T c  ( t )  T 9 2  0    ( d )  T j  T  0   2 1 8 2   T c  ( e )  T j 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…rms i and j) coincides with the condition for the internal stability of coalition
fi; jg. Hence pro…tability and internal stability are equivalent for two-member
coalitions and so it is indi¤erent whether we are focusing on cartels or on mergers
(because internal stability is always met for pro…table agreements).
We assume that …rm i is more e¢cient than …rm j, so its marginal cost prevails
after merging has taken place. This will imply in our notation j > i. Solving the
above expression for f we get
f ¸ fij = ¼ni + ¼nj ¡ ¼n¡1ij
For values of f above fij the n-…rm oligopoly is not stable. This boundary is
a function of the usual parameters (³, ® and n) and also, now, of i and j (that
are discrete variables, just as n) (see the Appendix for the complete expression).
The minimum of fij over i and j gives the upper bound for the stability of the
n-…rm oligopoly. This minimum is found to be f1n, giving rise to the following
Lemma.
Lemma 4.1. An oligopolistic structure with every …rm operating separately is
stable if and only if f < f1n(³; ®; n); for all ³; ® and n, where f1n(³; ®; n) denotes
the values of the …xed cost above which the most e¢cient and the least e¢cient
…rms want to join. This is the two-…rm agreement that generates the highest
surplus as compared with the situation in which …rms operate separately.
Proof. See Appendix.
An immediate corollary of this Lemma is that when n=3, triopoly is stable if
and only if f < f13(³; ®), as we have already shown in subsection 3.2.
The economic intuition for this …rst result is the following: the coalition
that minimizes fij = ¼ni + ¼
n
j ¡ ¼n¡1ij is the one which equivalently maximizes
¼n¡1ij ¡ ¼ni ¡ ¼nj and so it is the most attractive for the merging parties since it
generates the highest surplus to be shared; this movement is therefore the one
which most “threatens” the stability of the n-…rm oligopoly. The fact is that, due
to the constant marginal cost assumption, the high-cost …rm is shutdown and its
production is transferred to the other …rm: the gains are maximized when this
transfer occurs from the least e¢cient to the most e¢cient …rm in the market.
There is various evidence that this type of collusive agreement between very
e¢cient and very ine¢cient …rms may actually happen. See for example Bar-
ros(1998) for an application to a sample of concentration operations in the Por-
tuguese industry. Brealey and Myers(1988) argue that most gains from combining
complementary resources occur when small …rms are acquired by large ones. They
also refer to evg
unyfer tasr gayfgaoet a l …rm
for acquisition (see Palepu(1986)), which reinforces the importance of eliminating
ine¢ciencies as a motive for merger.
This result may seem counterintuitive in that it contradicts the conventional
wisdom according to which …rms would prefer good partners. Actually, accord-
ing to our …ndings, in a constant marginal cost context …rms always prefer the
bad partners, since they have to pay less for them and can thus keep most of
the surplus generated by the agreement. The rivalry e¤ect that would induce
…rms to choose closer rivals to merge with, and which is implicit in the Cournot
type of behavior, is more than compensated for by this incentive to “buy” cheap
partners. This result still holds if we consider non-constannd ciedeid iehe dedp  TD -0.0072  Tc (u) Tj4.32 0  TD 0.0254  Tc (t) Tj8.4 0  TD -0.0072  T 0  TD 0.0182  Tc j8.4 A0  TD -1.0072  Tc (h) Tj6.12p0  TD -0.0298  T6 0  TD 0.0182  Tc (e) Tj4.92 0  TD -.0072  Tc (d) Tj9.6  TD 0.0-0.0298  T60  TD 0509  Tc (i) Tj3.12 0  TD 0298  T6x0.0072  Tc (n) Tj6 0  (e) T)0  TD 0.0509  Tc (.) Tj8.04 0  TD11-1.0072  Tc (h 0  (e) TI0  TD -9.0072  Tc (h) Tj6.12 TD 0.10  Tc (a) Tj5.52 0  TD10 .0072  Tc (n) Tj6 0  TD 0.0437  Tc j5.52 0  TD -0.0072  Tc (n) Tj6 0  TD 0.0437  Tc (-) Tj3.72 0  TD 0.0182  Tc (c) Tj4.8 0  TD 0  Tc (o) Tj5.4 0  TD -0.0072  Tc (n) Tj6.12 0  TD -0.0298  Tc (s) Tj4.32 0  TD 0.0254  Tc (t) Tj4.2 0  TD 0  Tc (a) Tj5.TD -0.0072  Tc (n) Tj6 0  T TD -0.0072  Tc (n) Tj6 0  (e) Tj4.8  0.0182  Tc (c) Tj9 0  TD -0.0  Tc (o) Tj5.4  0  TD -0.0077  Tc (r) Tj4.2 0  TD 0.0254  Tc j4.2 g0  TD -0.0077  T (i) Tj3 0  TD -0.0072  Tc (n) Tj6.12 0  TD Tc (o) Tj5.4  0  TD -0.0077  T (l) Tj3 0  TD -00.0509  Tc (i) Tj4.8 0  TD 0  Tc (o) Tj5.4 0  TD -0.0072  Tc (n) Tj4.32 0  TD 0.0254  Tc (t) Tj4.2 0  TD 9509  Tc (i) Tj4.8 0  TD 0  Tc (o) Tj5.4 0  TD -0  Tc (n) Tj6 0  T TD -0.0072  Tc (n) Tj6 0  (e) Tj4.8 0.0182  Tc (e) Tj4.92 0  TD -0.0298  T (l) Tj3 0 x0.0072  Tc (n) Tj6 0  (e) Tj4.8 0.0182  Tc (e) Tj3 0 ,0  TD -0.0072  Tc (n) Tj6 0 hTD 0.0437  Tc j5.52 0  TD -1.0072  Tc (h) Tj7.56 0  TD 060509  Tc (i) Tj4.8 j9.6 0  TD -0.0072) Tj7.560  TD 0.0182  Tc (e) Tj8.4 0  TD 4-0.0072  Tc (h) Tj4.2 0  TD 0.0182  Tc (e) Tj3 0 ,0  TD -0.0072  T2 0  TD -0.0298  T072 0  (e) Tj4.8  0.0182  Tc (c) Tj9 0  TD -0.0  Tc (o) Tj5.4  0  TD -10509  Tc (i) Tj3.12y0  TD10 0.0072  Tc (h) Tj6.12b0  TD 0.0182  Tc (e) Tj4.92 0  TD3.480.01 (p) Tj6 0c (r) Tj4.2 0  TD 0.0182  Tc (e) Tj4.92 0  TD -0.0298  T072ehut desidi 1.0072  Tc (h) Tj6.12b0  TD 0.0182  Tc j5.4 0  TD -0. 072  T (t) Tj4.32 0  TD 0.0509  Tcc (n) Tj6 0 h D 0.90.0182  Tc (e 0  (e) Tj4.8 0.0182  Tc (e) j4.92 0  TD - .0298  T 0  TD 0 4.0072  Tc (n) Tj6 0 hTD 0.0-0.0298  T6 TD 0.04 7  Tc j5.52 0  TD -0.0072 T (l) Tj3 0  TD -0.0072  T j5. 2 0  TD -0.0072  T g0  TD - 509   i) Tj3 0  TD -0.0072  T (e) Tj8.4 0  TD 4-0. 072  Tc (h) Tj4.32 0  TD 0. 18   2 0  D 0.0254 Tc (t) Tj4.2 0  TD 0  Tc (a) T(i) Tj3.12 0  TD 0298  T6l0  TD -0.0298  T6l0  TD6. .0072  Tc (n) Tj6 0 p D -0.0298  Tc (r) Tj4.2 0  D 0.0254  Tc j4.2  0  TD -7.0072  Tc (h) Tj6.12 0  TD 0.0182  Tc(uTD 0.0182 e 4 8  0  TD 0.0509  Tc 0  TD  (1.0072  TTj5.4 0  TD -.0072  c (n) Tj6 0 f0  TD -.0182  Tc (e   (e) Tj4.8 0.0182 Tc (e) Tj4.92 0  TD -0.0 98  c (r) Tj4.2 0  TD  .0182  Tc (c) Tj9 0  TD -0.182  Tc (e) j8.4 0  TD 4- .0072  Tc (h) Tj4.2 0   . 182  c  4.2 g0  TD -0.0077  T (i) Tj3 0  TD -0.0072  Tc (n) Tj6.12 0  TD   Tc (o) Tj5.4 g  TD (7.0 72  Tc (h) Tj6.12hTD 0.0437  Tc j5.52 0  TD -0.0077 r 4 32 0  TD 0.0182  Tc (t) Tj4.2 0  TD 0  Tc (a) Tj5.TD -0.0072  Tc (n)  (i) Tj3 0 k  TD 0.0182  Tc (e) j8.4 0  TD 4-.0072  Tc (d) Tj9.6  TD 0.90.0182  Tc p0  TD -0. 298  T (l) Tj3 0  TD -0.0072 T j5.52 -0.0072 Tc (n) (i) Tj4.8 0 TD 0  Tc (o) 2 0  TD -0.0072 7 56;0  TD -48182  Tc (t) Tj4.2 0  TD   Tc (a) c (n) Tj6 0 hTD 0.0- .0298  T (i) Tj3 0 TD - 07 n) j4.32 0  TD3.44 TD (p) Tj6 0j6) Tj9 0  TD -0.182  Tc j5 TD -0.0072  c (n) (i) Tj3 0 k TD 0.0182  Tc (e) Tj8.4 0  TD 4-0.0072  Tc (h) Tj4.3  0  TD8.60509  Tc (i) Tj3 0  TD -0.-0.0298  T072 0  (e) Tj4.8 0605 9  Tc (i) Tj9 0  TD -0.182  Tc j5.TD0  TD -0 Tc (n) Tj6 0Tj4.2 0  TD 0..0254  Tc (t) Tj8.4 0  TD 9.2.0072  TTj5.4  0  TD -.0072  T (t) Tj4.32 0  TD 0.0509  Tc 0  TD 0  Tc (a) c (n) Tj4.2 0  TD 0.0182  Tc  4.2  -0.0072  Tc (n)  (i) Tj4.8 0  TD 0  Tc (o)  (t) Tj4.32 0  TD 0.0509  TcT(i) Tj3.12 0  TD 0298  T60  TD 0.0182  Tc (e) Tj8.4 0  TD 90.0182  Tcc (s) Tj6 0 f0  TD -2.0072  TTj5.4 0  TD -0  Tc (n) Tj6 0Tj4.2 0  TD  060509  Tcc (s) Tj6 0 …0  TD -0.0298  Tc (r) Tj4.2 0  TD 0.0254  Tc (i) Tj9 0  TD -0(p) Tj072  TTj5.4 1  TD 908.0072  T (t) Tj4.32 0  TD 00254  Tc j4.2  0  TD9.90182  Tcc (s) Tj6 0 j0  TD -2.0072  TTj5.4 0  TD -0  Tc (n)  (i) Tj3 0  TD -0.0072  Tc (n) Tj6.12 0  TD10 4.0072  TTj5.4  0  TD9.90182  Tc g0  TD -0509  Tc  0  TD -7.0072  T  0  TD -7.0072  Tc (h) Tj6.12 0  TD10 4.0072  T p0  TD -0.0298  T j5.4  0  TD -.0072  TTj6 0Tj4.2 0  TD 0..0254  Tc (t) Tj4.2 0  TD 0  Tc (a) c (n) Tj6 0  0  TD -0.0298  T (i) Tj4.8 0  TD 4-.0072  Tc (d) Tj4.2 0  TD 0..0254  Tc (t) Tj3 0 ,0  TD 0.0182  Tc (t) Tj4.92 0  TD -0.0298  T072) Tj7.560  TD 0.0182  Tc (e) Tj8.4 0  TD 4-.0072  Tc (d) Tj9.6  TD 0.10 0.0072  T (t) Tj4.2 0  TD 0  Tc (a) c (n) Tj6 0 hTD 0.0-0.0298  T j5.4 0  TD -00509  Tcc (s) Tj6 0 u0  TD 0  Tc (o) Tj5.4 g  TD -00509  Tcc (s) Tj6 0 h0  TD10 4.0072  TT(i) Tj3 0  TD -0.-0.0298  T072 0  (e) Tj4.8  060509  Tc-T(i) Tj3 0 w0  TD 0 TD -0.0072) Tj7.56 TD -0.-0.0298  T  TD -0.0072  T  TD -0-3800  T (p) Tj6 0c (r) Tj6.12hTD 0.0437  Tc j5.52 0  TD -10509  Tc (i) Tj3.120  TD 0.  Tc (n)  (i) Tj4.8 0  TD  (.0072  T (t) Tj4.32 0  TD 00254  Tc j4.2  0  TD9.1 Tc (a) c (n) Tj6 0 pTD 0.0437  Tc j5.52 0  TD -10509  Tc (i) Tj3.12yTD 0.90.0182  Tc (e) Tj9 0  TD -0.-0.0298  T j5.4 0  TD -00509  Tcc (s) Tj4.2 0  TD 0..0254  Tc (t) Tj8.4 0  TD 8-.0072  Tc (n) Tj6 0 f0  TD -.0182  Tc j5.4 0  TD -00509  Tcc (s) Tj4.2 0  TD 7-0.0298  T072) Tj7.56 TD -0.0072  T (e) Tj4.2 0  TD 0  Tc (a) T(i) Tj3.12.  TD 7-0.0298  T- (e) Tj4.2 I0  TD -90182  Tcc (s) Tj6 0  TD 0.0437  Tc2 0  TD 0.0182  Tc (e) Tj8.4 0  TD 4-.0072  T 0  TD 4-.0072  Tc (d) Tj9.6 dTD -0.-7 Tc (n)  (i) Tj3 0  TD -0.0072  Tc (n) Tj6.12 0  TD9.0437  Tc j5.52 0  TD9.1 Tc (a) c (n) Tj4.32 0  TD 0.0509  TcT(i) Tj3.12 0  TD 0298  T (e) Tj9 0  TD -0.-0.0298  Tc (n) Tj6 0 pTD 0.0437  Tc (l) Tj3 0  TD -0.0072  T (t) Tj8.4 0  TD 8-50254  Tc (t) Tj4.2 0  TD 0  Tc (a) c (n) Tj6 0 hTD 0.0-0.0298  Tc (r) Tj4.2 0  TD 0.0254  Tc (i) Tj4.92 0  TD -0.0298  T2 0  TD0  TD -0.0072) Tj9 0 -0  TD -0182  Tcc (s) Tj6 0 …0  TD -0.0298  Tc (r) Tj4.2 0  TD 0.0254  Tc (i) Tj9 0  TD -0(2-7 Tc (n) c (n) Tj6 0 f0  TD -.0182  Tcc (n) Tj4.2 0  TD 0.0182  Tc  4.2  -0.0072  Tc (n)  (i) Tj9 0  TD -0.-0.0298  T (e) Tj8.4 0  TD 4-.0072  Tc (d) Tj3 0 w0  TD 0 Tj072  TTj5.4 0  TD -00509  Tcc (s) Tj4.2 0  TD 0..0254  Tc (t) Tj3 0 k  TD 90.0182  Tcc (s) Tj3 0 w0  TD 00.0298  T072) Tj7.56 TD -0.0072  T (e) Tj4.2 0  TD 0  Tc (a) c (n) Tj6 0 hTD 0..-7 Tc (n)  (i) Tj3 0 q0  TD -7.0072  Tc (h) Tj6.12uTD 0.0437  Tc j5.52 0  TD -5 Tc (a) c (n) Tj6 0 dTD 0.0437  Tcc (s) Tj4.2 0  TD 0..0254  Tc j5.52 0  TD -.0072  T (t) Tj4.32 0  TD 00254  Tc (i) Tj3 0  TD -0.-0.0298  T072p ntn n
Further results on the pro…tability and internal stability of two-member coali-
tions can be found in the Appendix.
Based on the analysis of the shape of fij as a function of i and j (see Appendix)
we can say that the potential external instability of the agreement fi; jg comes
from the enlargement to include either the most e¢cient …rm left in the market
(let us denote it by 1’ and note that 1’ is …rm 1 if this does not yet belong to
the group) or the least e¢cient …rm left in the market (n’); which one is more
pro…table will depend on the relative e¢ciency of the coalition as compared with
the other …rms that are still operating, as shows the expression in the Appendix.
Let us denote fij by f intij and the minimum of ffij10 ; fijn0g by f extij and compute
fextij ¡ f intij . A necessary and su¢cient condition for coalition fi; jg to be stable
in a range (®; f) is that fextij ¡ f intij is positive.
The expression f extij ¡f intij is a function of i; j; n; ³; ®: When ® = 0 it is positive
for all n ¸ 5, so all two-member coalitions are stable in some non-empty range
of f , provided the market stays with at least four (groups of) operating …rms.21
These …ndings can be related to Selten(1973)’s results, according to which when
the number of competitors is less than or equal to 4 they have a tendency to
cooperate and maximize joint pro…t.
For ® strictly positive the di¤erence fextij ¡ f intij is concave in j and increasing
most of the time (except when f extij = fij1 and ® is too small - see Appendix). The
reason is that when j is small i is small too, and the agreement does not enjoy
either large external or internal stability; however as j increases internal stability
is reinforced and that is the main reason for the stability of the coalition to be
improved (that means, its range of stability is enlarged). As to i the evolution of
fextij ¡ f intij depends a lot on whether fextij = fij1 or f extij = fijn, as described in
the Appendix. Besides fij1 and fijn, note that a third possible expression for fextij
is fin(n¡1), which is the relevant one when the agreement already includes …rm
n, and i is such that the most pro…table enlargement is to include …rm (n ¡ 1).
The function fextij ¡ f intij in this case can be shown to increase with i, so the
coalition with the largest range of stability will have an intermediate i, such that
fextin = fin(n¡1).
There are three di¤erent candidates to be the most stable agreement with
…rms i and j: fi = 1; j = n ¡ 1g, fi = i1; j = n ¡ 1g, where i1 is such that
fijn = fij1, and fi = i2; j = ng, where i2 is such that fin(n¡1) = fin1. The
most stable agreement thus involves a very ine¢cient …rm (j = n or j = n ¡ 1)
and either a very e¢cient …rm (i = 1) or a …rm with an intermediate level of
e¢ciency. The solution will depend on the parameters of the problem (®; ³ and
21Notice that when ® = 0 fij10 = fijn0 :
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n). The analysis carried out at the extremes of ® (® = 0 and ® = ®) shows that
for su¢ciently low e¢ciency di¤erences an intermediate i is optimal, whereas for
a level of asymmetry large enough i = 1 is optimal.
Proposition 4.2. i) When …rms are symmetric and n ¸ 5 all two-member coali-
tions are stable in a well de…ned interval for the values of the …xed cost. For
n = 4 or n = 3 no two-…rm agreement can be stable.
ii) For low enough asymmetry levels the most stable two-…rm agreement involves
a …rm i with an intermediate level of e¢ciency (i such that the coalition is indif-
ferent between broadening to include the most e¢cient or the least e¢cient …rm
left in the market), and a …rm j very ine¢cient (j = n or j = n ¡ 1). When
the asymmetry level is su¢ciently large, then i = 1 and again j very ine¢cient
maximizes the stability of the agreement.
Proof. In the Appendix.
4.1.2. Broader agreements
In this section we discuss some of the results that can be obtained for a generic
coalition with more than two elements (r > 2, where r denotes the cardinality of
the coalition). At this level of generality results are not very conclusive.
When r ¸ 3 the pro…tability condition and the condition for internal stabil-
ity no longer coincide. As we said before, we restrict ourselves to the internal
stability condition based on avoiding every …rm from separating alone. Actually,
under asymmetry it is not clear that members prefer to exit alone, it may be
more attractive to leave in group (a simple example that illustrates the problem
is included in the Appendix); however, for tractability reasons we con…ne our
analysis to the simpler case, which may actually be the most relevant in a real
world economy.22
22 It is clear that in the symmetric case …rms always prefer to deviate alone, since they then
do not have to share the deviating pro…t with anyone else; in the asymmetric case, however,
there is an additional e¤ect, which works in the opposite direction, thus making the outcome
uncertain, namely that it may be interesting to leave with the most e¢cient …rm left in the
cartel so that this new rival stays with a weaker technology. What is sure is that if the most
e¢cient …rm in the coalition wants to leave in the company of another …rm it will choose the
second most e¢cient in the coalition, if it wants to leave with two more …rms it will choose the
second and the third, and so on. The preference for one or another solution will depend on the
size and composition of the coalition, as well as on the value of ®. For n = 3 we are able to show
that …rms always prefer to deviate from the grand coalition alone rather than in the company
of another …rm (section 3.2 and the corresponding part of the Appendix): this result, however,
is not generalizable for higher n and higher cardinality of the coalition.
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Consider the coalition C = fe1; e2; :::; erg; with its members ranked in de-
scending order of e¢ciency and #C = r. Denote by f intC the condition for its
internal stability:
¼C ¡ f ¸
X
i2C
(¼ijCnfig ¡ f) , f ¸ f intC =
P
i2C
¼ijCnfig ¡ ¼C
r ¡ 1
External stability is de…ned either by
f · f ext1C = ¼C + ¼1jC ¡ ¼C[f1g (e1 > 1)
or by
f · f extnC = ¼C + ¼njC ¡ ¼C[fng (er < n)
The pro…tability condition (above which the coalition forms) is given by
f ¸ fprofC = ¼Cnfefg + ¼ef jCnfefg ¡ ¼C
where ef denotes the last …rm that joined the agreement.
If coalition C is a cartel, then a necessary and su¢cient condition for it to
have a range of stability is that
fextC ¡ maxffprofC ; f intC g > 0
where fextC = minffext1C ; fextnC g.23 Instead, if we consider an irreversible merger,
this condition is simply
f extC ¡ fprofC > 0
which is clearly at least as easy to verify as the condition for the stability of the
cartel. Thus, whenever a cartel is stable the corresponding merger is also stable,
as is patent in the …gures below (note that if fextC was not the outer line, as can
happen, there would be no stability area).
If ® = 0 the two conditions for external stability are the same and the con-
dition for internal stability is f ¸ f intC = r:¼ijCnfig¡¼Cr¡1 . It can be shown that
fextC ¡ fprofC > 0 for all r · n ¡ 3, so we conclude that symmetric mergers are
23We can have fprofC ><
f intC : the fact that some coalition has formed may not be su¢cient to
ensure that it will not be dissolved.
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Figure 4.1: Stability areas
stable in [fprofC ; f
ext
C ], provided they do not lead to triopoly, nor to duopoly.
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Monopoly is the stable market structure for all values of the …xed cost such that
f > fextC (r = n ¡ 3; :) = fprofC (r = n ¡ 2; :).
As to cartels, f intC > f
prof
C for all r > 2 (for two-member agreements we
know that f intC = f
prof
C ), so a necessary and su¢cient condition for the cartel
with r symmetric …rms to have a range of stability is that fextC ¡ f intC > 0. This
condition is veri…ed for n ¸ 5 + 4(r ¡ 2), or, equivalently, for r · n+34 , so the
higher the cardinality of the cartel, the higher has to be n. In other words,
cartels which imply a too high degree of concentration cannot be stable: more
than 75% of the initial number of …rms must remain operating. The reason has
to do with internal stability, since external stability is stronger the higher r is (as
will be illustrated in the next subsection). Actually higher concentration makes it
more attractive to deviate and enjoy the pro…ts of a highly concentrated market,
therefore weakening internal stability. This e¤ect is su¢ciently strong to outweigh
the e¤ect on external stability. For a given n the stability of symmetric cartels is
thus more di¢cult the more members they enclose.
Note that the condition for the stability of symmetric cartels (r · n+34 ) is
much more stringent than the condition for the stability of symmetric mergers
(r · n ¡ 3). Mergers can thus enclose a much higher proportion of the total
24 In the work of Espinosa and Iñarra(1995) duopolies and triopolies have a range of stability,
because they consider the x-oligopoly to be externally stable whenever the (x-1)-oligopoly is not
internally stable (for example, duopoly is externally stable for values of the …xed cost below
which monopoly is internally unstable).
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